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Abstract
The paper examines the eﬀect of inﬂation on the growth rate in
economies with underground, or ”non-market”, sectors. The model
incorporates a non-market good into an endogenous growth cash-in-
advance economy with human capital. Taxes on labor and capital in-
duce substitution into the non-market sector which avoids such taxes.
However the non-market sector uses only cash for exchange and can-
not avoid the inﬂation tax, while the market sector allows costly credit
use. We estimate a MIMIC model for latent underground economy
using monthly data for Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Further-
more, we estimate a dynamic structural equation model and investi-
gate short-run eﬀects of the underground economy on output growth
and test for Granger causality and long-run cointegrating relationships
using bivariate Granger-causality tests and Johansen’s maximum like-
lihood technique. The result indicate diﬀerent shares of underground
economies across the three countries and a positive long-run eﬀect of
underground economy on output growth.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31, E13, O42, C31, C51, C52
Keywords: Shadow economy, endogenous growth, dynamic structural equa-
tion modelling, latent variables.
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11 Introduction
Schneider (2000, 2003) and Schneider and Enste (2000) document the signif-
icant size of the shadow economies internationally, and how the sizes diﬀer.
For example, Schneider (2000) reports that the shadow output equals some
39% of the actual magnitude of reported GDP in developing countries, 23%
in transition countries and 14% in OECD countries. Meanwhile the labor
force, as a percent of the oﬃcial labor force is about 50% in developing and
transition countries and 17% in OECD countries. This makes potential tax
collection across regions quite diﬀerent. A country with a large labor supply
in the shadow economy may ﬁnd a tax on labor income inferior to alternatives
such as use of the so-called inﬂation tax.
Using the inﬂation tax as a means of revenue collection can adversely
aﬀect growth. There is a substantial body of evidence now of such a negative
growth eﬀect especially in large panel studies. Moreover there is evidence
that the magnitude of the negative eﬀect of inﬂation on growth can diﬀer
among developing and industrial countries. For example Gillman, Harris and
Matyas (2004) ﬁnd that inﬂation has a larger marginal negative eﬀect in a
OECD sample as compared to an APEC sample at all levels of the inﬂation
rate. Harris and Gillman (2003) control for standard measures of ﬁnancial
development and ﬁnd further evidence supporting a more signiﬁcant decrease
in the growth rate, from an inﬂation rate increase, the more developed is the
economy.
The literature on inﬂation and growth does not consider the possible
role that the diﬀering size of the shadow economies may play in explaining
diﬀerences across regions. And the literature on the shadow economies tends
not to investigate how the shadow economies aﬀect the ability of countries
to raise taxes and to achieve growth. But there is the fundamental issue
that reliance on the inﬂation tax in countries with big shadow economies
can signiﬁcantly lower the growth rate. Since the inﬂation tax is deemed a
relatively ineﬃcient tax, such ﬁndings if supported empirically would suggest
that there may be better ways to raise such taxes.
The contribution of this paper is to present a dynamic general equilibrium
2analysis of how inﬂation can eﬀect growth in economies with shadow sectors.
Then the analysis is backed up with extensive econometric testing using
transition country data. This enables us to reach some conclusions relative
to how inﬂation can be viewed relative to other tax policies across regions in
which the shadow sector plays varying roles.
The departure point for the analysis is the model of Parente, Rogerson
and Wright (1999,2000). This is an exogenous growth economy without
money or any taxes, but with a role for development through a diﬀering cost
of capital depending on development level. We take this model and set it
in an endogenous growth monetary framework with a variety of taxes. This
provides a rigorous setting for determining the role of the shadow sector.1
As in Piggott, J. and Whalley, J. (1996), Parente, Rogerson and Wright
(1999, 2000) introduce a non-market Beckerian (1965)-like sector with a spe-
ciﬁc production function. They start with Parente and Prescott (1994)-type
distortions that increase the cost of new physical capital above one, whereby
there is a higher such cost of new investment for developing versus developed
countries. They make the case that introduction of the non-market sector
makes it easier to to match the empirical facts regarding income inequality
along the exogenous growth path. In particular a smaller magnitude of the
distortion to the cost of physical capital investment is required, making the
model more plausible in reconciling income levels between developed and
developing countries.
Using a model that can explain income diﬀerentials on the basis of a
non-market sector is a natural basis for investigating the nature of shadow
economies across regions that are characterized by diﬀerent income levels.
However for an examination of how diﬀerent taxes including inﬂation aﬀect
the shadow economy, the market sector needs to include various taxes while
the non-market sector needs to include some type of ability to avoid such
taxes. The problem is that for example with a tax on labor and capital in
the market sector, and no such taxes in non-market sector, the agent would
want to supply all labor and capital to the non-market sector. A way to
1For alternative modelling approaches see for example Loayza (2003), Azuma and
Grossman (2002), or Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein (2003).
3model taxes and their evasion, while having the agent willing to supply labor
to both market and non-market sectors, is to model the evasion activity
explicitly.2
Modeling corruption explicitly requires a further change for Parente,
Rogerson and Wright (1999,2000). There the non-market sector cannot add
its goods output to the total income of the economy that is in turn di-
vided into consumption and investment. This creates some divergences in
the return on capital from that found in a standard economy. By explicitly
modelling the corruption, the output of the non-market sector can be added
to the output of the market sector to give the total output that is then di-
vided between consumption and investment. This is natural since the market
and non-market goods are substitutes. And this symmetric treatment of the
sectors eliminates the discrepancies in the equilibrium conditions that exist
in Parente, Rogerson and Wright, making for a set of standard equilibrium
conditions regarding the allocation of labor and capital.
An “Islands”government (as in the Isle of Mann, the Bahamas, and
Switzerland - the island in the EU- for capital taxes, and Sicily for labor
taxes) is postulated that keeps the non-market sector from having to pay
taxes but that charges a competitive based fee for this service, depending
on the tax being avoided. Then since the agent is acting in part as the Is-
lands government, the proﬁt of the tax evasion is transferred in a lump sum
back to the consumer. This production of this corruption is modelled using
only labor, and this labor activity takes away from the labor available for
human capital investment. The balanced-path growth rate of the economy
can thereby fall as the corruption activity is larger.
Introducing money into the economy requires taking a stand on whether
the market sector and non-market sectors diﬀer in there use of money versus
credit. Credit use typically leaves a “paper trail”that can be incriminating
and so would be avoided (Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein 2003). The assump-
tion here that accommodates the notion that the shadow economy is a cash-
2See Einarsson and Marquis (2001) for an endogenous growth, non-monetary, economy
with a non-market sector and taxes in the market sector. The study the welfare eﬀects
of distortionary taxation on labor, capital, and the market good relative to the exogenous
growth economy.
4only economy so as to avoid the incriminating “paper trail”is that only ﬁat
money (cash) is used in the shadow economy, while the agent in buying the
market goods can use any combination of cash and credit.
The endogenous growth setting with human capital is necessary in order
to model a way in which inﬂation can lower the return to human capital,
and thus the growth rate. This is because the growth rate depends on the
return to capital, physical and human capital returns are equal in equilib-
rium, and both returns are thereby lowered by increases in the inﬂation rate.
An important diﬀerence from Parente, Rogerson and Wright (1999,2000) is
that in going to an endogenous growth model with human capital, instead
of assuming exogenous growth, diﬀerences in the cost of investment as in
Parente and Prescott (1994) can now be modelled as diﬀerences in the pro-
ductivity parameter of the human capital investment function. The switch
to introducing diﬀerences in the cost of new capital in terms of the human
capital accumulation process instead of the physical accumulation process
follows the respected literature of Schultz (1964) and Lucas (2002) that em-
phasizes an increased return on human capital can explain the transition
from developing to developed economies.
With these dimensions of the problem endogenized - a non-market sector,
taxes on the market good, inﬂation as a tax on money use, competitive cor-
ruption, human capital, and endogenous growth - we study how the inﬂation
eﬀect on growth diﬀers between developed and developing economies based
on the nature of the explicit taxes, the size of their non-market sectors, the
taste for corruption, and the degree of cash across these sectors.
2 The endogenous growth monetary economy
The model is an extension of Gillman and Kejak’s (2004a) monetary econ-
omy with endogenous growth. The non-market good is combined with the
market good in a constant elasticity of substitution fashion. Let the market
consumption good be denoted at time t by cmt; and the non-market good
by cnt. The aggregate consumption good is denoted by ct, and with º and
" utility function parameters, it is given to the representative agent as the
5following combination of market and non-market goods
ct = [ºc
"




2.1 The Representative Consumer Problem
The consumer has a preference for both the market and the non-market
goods, as well as leisure, denoted by xt. With parameters ¹ and " determining
the relative preference for the market versus non-market good, the current











2.1.1 Capital and time allocation, and human capital investment
The consumer rents labor and capital for use in the production functions
of the market and non-market goods. Let the shares of the physical capital
stock in each sector be denoted by smt, and snt where
smt + snt = 1: (3)
The agent accumulates physical and human capital, denoted by kt and
ht; using household production of the human capital investment, denoted
by ˙ ht; with a constant returns to scale function in only eﬀective labor, as
in Lucas (1988), where the eﬀective labor is the raw labor multiplied by the
human capital stock. The consumer also household produces a credit service,
assumed also to use only eﬀective labor.
Let the raw labor allocations to the same sectors be given by lmt, lnt, and
lht, with the labor allocated to the credit (exchange ﬁnance) sector and to
leisure denoted by ldt and xt, respectively. There is also labor time used in
the corruption activity of the Islands government, denoted by lct, whereby
lmt + lnt + lht + lFt + xt + lct = 1: (4)
The human capital investment production function with Ah > 0 is given
by
6˙ ht = Ahlhtht ¡ ±hht: (5)
The consumer receives capital and labor income from working in the
sectors of the market good and the non-market good, and receives labor
income from working to provide the Islands corruption service; plus their are
the receipts of the lump sum transfer from the government Vt and the return
of proﬁt (kickbacks) from the Islands corruption service ΠctPt. Expenditures
are made on the market and non-market good plus physical, money stock,
and bond investments. The resulting current income budget constraint is
0 = (1 ¡ ¿l)wtPtlmtht + (1 ¡ cl)wtPt(lnt + lct)ht +
(1 ¡ ¿k)rtPtsmtkt + (1 ¡ ck)rtPt (1 ¡ smt)kt (6)
+Vt + ΠctPt ¡ (1 + ¿c)Ptcmt ¡ (1 + cc)Pntcnt
¡˙ kt ¡ ±kkt ¡ ˙ mt ¡ ¼tmt ¡ ˙ bt + bt(Rt ¡ ¼t): (7)
2.1.2 Exchange
The goods output forms an input into the Becker (1965)- type household
production of each of the two consumption good cmt and cnt. The goods
used as an input for producing the output are denoted by ycmt and ycnt .
The other input is exchange, denoted by yemt and yent, which enters the
production function fc(¢)
cmt = fc(ycmt;yemt); (8)
cnt = fc(ycnt;yent) (9)
The production function for the consumption good is assumed to be Leon-
tieﬀ, whereby the isoquant ray from the origin has a slope of one. This
implies, where the relative price of the inputs is between zero and inﬁnity,
that
cmt = ycmt; (10)
cmt = yemt; (11)
cnt = ycnt; (12)
cnt = yent: (13)
7The exchange in turn is produced using two inputs: real money balances,
denoted by mt , and real credit, denoted by dt. These inputs are perfect
substitutes. Let Pt denote the nominal price of the market good, with it
serving as the numeraire. Then the total exchange value is given by
ycmt + (Pnt=Pt)ycnt = mt + dt: (14)
Real money balances are deﬁned as the nominal money stock, denoted
by Mt , divided by the nominal price of goods output, denoted by Pt;
mt ´ Mt=Pt. The initial nominal money stock M0 is given to the con-
sumer. Additional money stock is transferred to the consumer exogenously
in a lump sum fashion by an amount Vt. The consumer buys some fraction of
the output goods with money, and the rest buys with credit. Let at 2 (0;1]
denote the fraction of output goods bought with money.3 Then the agents
demand for money is constrained to be this fraction of goods purchased. In
real terms,
mt = atycmt + (Pnt=Pt)ycnt; (15)
which by substitution from equation (10) gives a Clower (1967)-type con-
straint of
mt = atcmt + (Pnt=Pt)cnt; (16)
or in nominal terms,
Mt = atPtcmt + Pntcnt: (17)
Credit demand is the residual fraction of output goods purchases. In real
terms,
dt = (1 ¡ at)ycmt; (18)
or substituting in from equation (10) gives that
3An equilibrium with a = 0 does not have well-deﬁned nominal prices.
8dt = (1 ¡ at)cmt; (19)
where ct can be viewed as the scale factor of a derived demand for the input.
The credit, per unit of consumption goods output, is produced with a
function fd(¢) in a separate sector using the labor, denoted by lFt, factored
by the human capital ht, and normalized per unit of goods output
dt=cmt = fd(ldtht=cmt): (20)
In particular, it is assumed that the normalized credit output of dt=cmt is
produced with the normalized eﬀective labor in a diminishing returns fashion.




This function is homogenous of degree one in lFtht and in cmt , more





There is a ready interpretation of equation (22). A credit card company such
as American Express, in a decentralized setting, would maximize proﬁt while
taking as given how much is spent on goods for consumption. American Ex-
press would not try to change this goods expenditure but must consider it in
making its optimal credit supply available to the consumer. From the con-
sumer point of view, to increase the share of goods bought with credit, the
consumer must increase the time allocation ldt and faces diminishing returns
to such eﬀort. Thus making its inputs proportional to such consumption
goods is a natural way to supply the credit. A similar decentralized prob-
lem is made explicit in Gillman and Kejak (2004b); this reveals that the
explicit price of credit is the nominal interest rate but otherwise changes
no equilibrium conditions, and it is foregone here for the sake of brevity of
presentation.
9Setting the credit demand equal to credit supply, from equations (19) and
(22),
(1 ¡ at) = AF(ldtht=cmt)
°: (23)
and substituting into equation (17) for at from equation (23), the money and








Ptcmt + Pntcnt: (24)
2.2 Goods Production
The output of the market and non-market goods are each produced by a
representative ﬁrm using CRS technologies in capital and eﬀective labor.
With Am > 0; An > 0; ¯ 2 (0;1); and ® 2 (0;1); the production technologies
are
cmt = Am (smtk t)
¯ (lmtht)
1¡¯ ; (25)
cnt = An (sntk t)
® (lntht)
1¡® : (26)
Given the explicit taxes on goods, labor, and capital for the market good and
the corruption fees on goods, labor and capital for the non-market goods, and
with pnt ´ Pnt=Pt; the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrms’s proﬁt maximization
implies that
wt = (1 ¡ ¯)An (smtk t)
¯ (lmtht)
¡¯ ; (27)
rt = ¯An (smtk t)
¯¡1 (lmtht)
1¡¯ ; (28)
wt = pnt (1 ¡ ®)An (sntk t)
® (lntht)
¡® ; (29)
rt = pnt®An (sntk t)
®¡1 (lntht)
1¡® : (30)
102.3 Government Budget Constraint
The agent faces proportional taxes on the labor, capital and goods in the
market sector, denoted by ¿l; ¿k; and ¿c; and receives from the government
a nominal lump sum transfer of the tax revenue denoted by Vt. Also the
government can supply new money through open market operations in which
it buys nominal bonds, denoted by Bt; and pays nominal interest on the bonds
of Rt: The government budget constraint is given by
Vt = ¿lwtPtlmtht + ¿krtPtsmtkt + ¿cPtcmt + ˙ Mt + ˙ Bt ¡ BtRt: (31)
It is assumed that the money supply grows at a constant rate of ¾
˙ Mt = ¾Mt: (32)
In real terms, dividing equation (32) by Pt implies that the government’s
investment rate in real money is the supply growth rate minus the inﬂation-
based deprecation of ˙ Pt=Pt ´ ¼
˙ mt = (¾ ¡ ¼)mt: (33)
Deﬁning Bt=Pt ´ bt; then ( ˙ Bt ¡ BtRt)=Pt = ˙ bt ¡ bt(Rt ¡ ¼t); and the
government constraint in real terms is
Vt=Pt = ¿lwtlmtht + ¿krtsmtkt + ¿ccmt + ˙ mt + ¼mt + ˙ bt ¡ bt(Rt ¡ ¼t): (34)
2.4 Islands Government
The Islands government produces the corruption that is necessary to enable
the consumer to avoid paying explicit labor, capital and goods taxes when
supplying labor or capital to the non-market sector, or when buying the
non-market good. However there is a proportional fee for the Islands cor-
ruption service, denoted by cl; ck; and cc; that is levied on the labor and
capital rentals to the non-market sector, and on the market good. The sum
clwtPtlntht + ckrtPtsntkt + ccPtcnt comprises the real quantity of corruption
11services, denoted by ·t; that the Islands government supplies. This implies
that
·t = clwtlntht + ckrtsntkt + ccpntcnt + clwtlctht: (35)
The quantity of the corruption service, denoted by ·t ´ St=Pt; is equal
to the quantity of the non-market good. This implies that the corruption
service and the non-market good are assumed to be Leontieﬀ combined in a
one-to-one fashion when the consumer buys the non-market good. And the
consumer must have both the corruption and the non-market good in order
to consume it.
The Islands maximizes real per period proﬁt, denoted as Πct=Pt: The price
received by the Islands government for their eﬀort to produce corruption is
denoted by pct. This makes the proﬁt maximization problem
Πct=Pt = pct·t ¡ wtlct; (36)
subject to the production function with ! 2 (0;1) of
·t = Ac (lctht=cnt)
! : (37)
The production function implies that there are diminishing returns to in-
creasing ·t by increasing the share of labor devoted to corruption activity
lct: The Islands government can solve its demand for corruption labor from
its ﬁrst order condition as
pct = (wtlct)=(!·t) ´ wt=MPlc; (38)
or that the relative price is the marginal factor cost wt divided by the
marginal product of labor.
2.5 Equilibrium
The consumer maximizes the following Hamiltonian with respect to cmt; cnt;
















+¸t[(1 ¡ ¿l)wtlmtht + (1 ¡ cl)wt (lnt + lct)ht + (1 ¡ ¿k)rtsmtkt
+(1 ¡ ck)rt (1 ¡ smt)kt + Vt=Pt + Πct=Pt ¡ (1 + ¿c)cmt ¡ (1 + cc)pntcnt
¡˙ kt ¡ ±kkt ¡ ˙ mt ¡ ¼tmt ¡ ˙ bt + bt(Rt ¡ ¼t)]
+´t [Ah (1 ¡ lmt ¡ lnt ¡ ldt ¡ xt ¡ lct)ht ¡ ±hht]
+¹t
·









¡ (1 + cc)Pntcnt
¸
:
A reduced set of twenty-two equilibrium conditions in twenty-two un-



































(1 + ¿c); (43)








(1 ¡ at) = Ad(ldtht=cmt)
°; (45)
gt = r(1 ¡ ¿k) ¡ ±k ¡ ½; (46)
gt = Ah(1 ¡ xt) ¡ ±h ¡ ½; (47)
13gt = Ahlht ¡ ±h; (48)
gt = ¾ ¡ ¼t; (49)
gt = Ahlht ¡ ±h; (50)
gt = ¾ ¡ ¼t; (51)
pct = (wtlct)=(!·t) ´ wt=MPlc; (52)
·t = ¿lwtlntht + ¿krt [1 ¡ smt]kt + ¿cpntcnt; (53)














= (cmt=kt) + (pntcnt=kt) + gt + ±k;
wt = (1 ¡ ¯)An (smtk t)
¯ (lmtht)
¡¯ ; (56)
rt = ¯An (smtk t)
¯¡1 (lmtht)
1¡¯ ; (57)
wt = pnt (1 ¡ ®)An (sntk t)
® (lntht)
¡® ; (58)















lmt + lnt + lht + ldt + xt + lct = 1; (61)
2.6 The Eﬀect of the Shadow Economy on the BGP
Equilibrium
A closed-from solution of the economy is not possible. For example, the
value of the non-market sector output cannot be solved, but some relations
are implied. From equation (40) plus equation (44), it is unambiguous that
the higher is the nominal interest rate (or inﬂation rate if also using equation
(42)) then the lower is the non-market goods consumption relative to the
14market goods consumption. Inﬂation causes substitution to the market good
from the non-market good. This results because the average exchange cost
of market goods, using some credit, goes up by less than R when R increases
while the average exchange cost of non-market goods equals R and goes up
one for one with R:
Proposition 2.6.1 The rate of return of capital is not aﬀected by the size
of the market sector.
Proposition 2.6.2 The growth rate is decreased unambiguously by a larger
non-market sector, given that all other parameters are equal except for º:
As the preference º for the non-market sector is made larger, then the
sector increases in size relative to the market sector. This causes more money
to be used overall in the economy, and makes the interest elasticity of money
demand more inelastic. When the inﬂation rate increases, the growth rate
then decreases by more. Thus with all factors equal except for the taste
for corruption being greater, or the respect for the government with taxing
authority to be lessor, the growth rate will be lower for any given inﬂation
rate.
Other factors also aﬀect the growth rate through the non-market sector.
The greater is the eﬃciency of production of the Islands government, the less
labor that will be used up in non-productive corruption-producing activity,
and the higher will be the time available for all other activities, which acts
as a small stimulant to growth relative to an ineﬃcient Islands government.
Taxes aﬀect the equilibrium in several ways. There is neutrality in terms
of the ratio of market to non-market consumption with respect to taxes
because of the structure of the equilibrium, whereby the Islands government
must charge the same implicit taxes on goods, labor and capital. A higher
tax on capital directly lowers the growth rate. A higher tax on goods, and
a higher tax on labor, causes more money use, and makes money demand
more inelastic. This in itself causes a more severely negative inﬂation-growth
eﬀect. Countries that rely on VATs more than others thereby tend to increase
the negative eﬀect of inﬂation on growth, and it may be that economies with
big non-market sectors rely on the VAT more than others.
15An extension would be to allow the preference parameter º depend on
the average tax rate. Then clearly the average tax rate would cause a larger
non-market sector. Given that some of this was higher average tax was in
terms of goods and labor taxes, the money demand would be more inelastic
and the inﬂation-growth eﬀect more severe. With some in capital taxes, then
the growth rate would of course be lower as well.
Another eﬀect is through the capital intensity of the market versus the
non-market sector. As the inﬂation rate increases, the human capital is
taxed and there is substitution from labor to capital. This favors expansion
of the capital intensive sector. Assuming the market sector is more capital
intensive, then the increase in the inﬂation rate will cause contraction in the
non-market sector.
Some of these model-implied relationships can be tested empirically, and
to this end we formulate several simple hypotheses.
Hypothesis H1: The relationship between the nominal interest rate and the
share of the underground economy is negative.
Hypothesis H2: The relationship between the inﬂation rate and the share
of the underground economy is negative.
Hypothesis H3: The output growth is negatively related to the share of the
underground economy.
While H1–H3 formulate the key implications from the theoretical model
in an empirically testable way, not all theoretically-implied relations can be
straightforwardly tested due to data limitations. For example, having no
data on taxes with suﬃcient time-variability, the eﬀects of taxes cannot be




The main characteristic of the “underground”or “shadow”economy is the un-
observability. Thus the unoﬃcial part of the economy is a classical example
of a latent variable. Given the latent nature of this important economic
quantity, the issue of its empirical measurement becomes exceptionally im-
portant in econometric models that include underground economy as endoge-
nous or exogenous variable (Giles 1998b, Giles and Caragata 1999, Giles and
Johnson 2000).
Literature on the methods for empirical measurement of the underground
economy is extensive and several approaches are present in the literature.
Schneider (2000) and Schneider and Enste (2000) review the existing ap-
proaches and apply several diﬀerent methods to estimate the share of the
underground economy in the OECD and developing countries.4 Johnson et
al. (1997) attempted to provide similar underground economy estimates for
transitional countries, and Johnson et al. (1998) extend this analysis to the
OECD and Latino-American countries.
However, most of these methods use various proxies and indirect measure-
ment and thus fail to model the underground economy explicitly, as a latent
variable. Frey and Weck (1983) termed such approaches “naive”, and in a
later paper they made a pioneering attempt to model the shadow economy us-
ing structural equation methods (Frey and Weck-Hanneman 1984, Helberger
and Knepel 1988). The structural equation modelling (SEM)5 was later im-
plemented by Aigner et al. (1988), Loayza (1996), and Giles (1999). These
authors used a special case of the general structural equation model with a
single latent variable and multiple observed causes known as the “MIMIC”
4Schneider identiﬁes six main approaches to empirical measurement of the underground
economy: a) discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics, b) discrep-
ancy between oﬃcial and actual labour force, c) transactions approach, d) currency de-
mand approach, e) physical input, and e) model approach. See also Giles (1998a) for
further literature review.
5The structural equation model with latent variables is often referred to as “LIS-
REL model” in conjecture with the computer programme LISREL 8.54 (see e.g. Czir´ aky
(2004a)).
17model.6
The MIMIC model of Zellner (1970), Goldberger (1972a), Goldberger
(1972b), and J¨ oreskog and Goldberger (1975) is a special case of the general
structural equation model with latent variables (J¨ oreskog and S¨ orbom 1996),
though proposed before the “LISREL” model of J¨ oreskog (1973). J¨ oreskog
and S¨ orbom (1996) further generalised this model allowing for multiple ob-
servable indicators of multiple latent variables. The model with a single
latent variable (Zellner 1970, Goldberger 1972b) turned out to be a special
case of the general covariance structure model of J¨ oreskog (1970), and was
analysed in detail in this framework by J¨ oreskog and Goldberger (1975).
The MIMIC model (J¨ oreskog and Goldberger 1975) is most frequently es-
timated by Gaussian maximum likelihood (ML) procedure of J¨ oreskog (1970),
which requires assumptions that are seldom satisﬁed in the shadow economy
measurement models such as those estimated by Giles (1999). The require-
ment of independence of observations and the static nature of the model
are among the major weaknesses of the MIMIC models estimated by the co-
variance structure ML methods. In addition, MIMIC models enable merely
estimation of the latent underground economy series and do not permit struc-
tural modelling of the eﬀects of the underground economy on other economic
variables such as output growth in the market sector.
An additional weakness of the MIMIC models of the Frey and Weck-
Hanneman (1984) –type is that the supposedly error-free “causes” usually
represent variables that are either observed with considerable error or that
are themselves latent constructs. An example such construct is the “tax
immorality” variable from the Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) model which
is, no doubt, a latent construct, however in the existing literature on that
uses the MIMIC approach this variable is assumed to be a perfectly observed
“cause” of the latent hidden economy. Similar examples are the “labour
market restrictions” and the “strength of the enforcement system” variables
from the MIMIC model estimated by Loayza (1996); or “degree of economic
regulation”, “development of taxation”, and “tax burden” variables used as
“causes” of the underground economy in the Giles (1999) model.
6The abbreviation “MIMIC” stands for Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes.
18The assumption of independent observations needed for the validity of
the J¨ oreskog (1970) estimation procedure generally excludes time series and
panel data, nevertheless the underground economy literature mainly uses this
procedure (Frey and Weck-Hanneman 1984, Aigner et al. 1988, Loayza 1996,
Giles 1999).
Methods for estimation of factor analytic and latent variable models that
are appropriate for time series data exist in the literature, though they were
not so far used for the underground economy estimation. For example, meth-
ods for estimation of dynamic factor models were proposed by Geweke and
Singleton (1981) and Singleton (1980) and Engle and Watson (1981). Pena
and Box (1987) proposed a procedure for dimension-reduction in time series
data and, more recently, Bai and Ng (2002) and Bai (2003) developed pro-
cedures for determining the number of factors in approximate factor models
and inferential theory for factor models of large dimension.
These methods could be used for estimation of the shadow economy mea-
surement models, but they do not alow causal or structural relationships in
the model. In order to incorporate shadow economy in macroeconometric
models it is necessary to use full structural equation models with latent vari-
ables and estimation techniques suitable for time series data. MIMIC models
could be then used merely as an auxiliary tool for delivering descriptive es-
timates of the latent underground economy series.
The aim of the methods proposed in this paper is to enable both mea-
surement of the latent underground economy series and estimation of the
dynamic structural equation models that include underground economy as
latent variable. In such models the underground economy latent variable
might aﬀect, or be aﬀected by, other modelled variables.
The measurement of the underground economy is relevant more for de-
scriptive and comparative purposes then for econometric modelling of the
underground economy’s impact on e.g. market-sector output growth. Hence
for the purpose of measuring the underground economy we specify a MIMIC–
type model using the available macroeconomic data rather then measurement-
error-prone constructs commonly used in the literature. Subsequently, we
estimate a dynamic structural equation model that captures the impact of
19the underground economy’s share on the growth rate of the market-sector
output as well as the relation between the underground economy and the
other macroeconomic variables.
3.2 Estimation of the latent underground economy
The idea that certain model-implied relationships can be used to estimate
the level of the underground economy by substituting observed variables for
the latent ones is not new in the literature and is usually related to currency-
demand models (see e.g. Bhattacharyya (1990). Giles (1999) uses a similar
approach to set the scale of the latent underground economy by estimating
a “long-run average” or expected value of the underground economy. This
approach avoids arbitrary assumptions about the long-run average or a start
year without underground economy.
Using the equilibrium conditions from the theoretical model we aim to
estimate the mean of the underground economy, which is needed for setting
the scale and range of the estimated latent underground economy variable.
We show that in addition to the mean level it is also possible to calculate
the underground economy time series using econometric estimation equations
derived directly from the theoretical model, however possibly more eﬃcient
estimates can be obtained from a latent variable measurement model such
as the MIMIC model (multiple indicators multiple causes). The estimates
of the latent underground economy from a MIMIC model, however, would
be scale-free and should be normalised according to information that is not
obtainable from the MIMIC model itself.
We use model-implied equilibrium conditions (40), (43) and (44) to esti-
mate the expected level (long-run average) of the underground economy.
Firstly, we need to make few simplifying assumptions in order to deal with
the otherwise untractable non-linearities in the equilibrium conditions. Note
that in (1) and (2) the aggregate consumption good and the current period
utility function were parameterised with the utility function parameters º and
". Without loss of generality, we can assume an admissible value for ", namely
" = 2, in which case the aggregate consumption good ct = [ºc"
mt+(1¡º)c"
nt]1="




mt + (1 ¡ º)c2
nt. In addition, we set the ° parameter in the
production function (21) to its mean admissible value of 0.5, recalling that
° 2 (0;1).
Speciﬁcally, we obtain an estimation equation of the form
ln(ytpmt) = ®0 + ln(®1x1 + ®2x2 + ®3x3 + ®4x4 ¡ cmt); (62)
where ®0 ´ ¡ln[(1 ¡ º)=º], ®1 ´ A2=¯, ®2 ´ ¡A2=±, ®3 ´ ¯=±, ®4 ´



















The above equation can be estimated with non-linear least squares (NLS) or
maximum likelihood (ML) techniques.
The relevance of the equation (62) is twofold. By estimating ®0 and
exponentiating the negative of its estimated value we can obtain the long-
run or time-average value of the underground economy (see Appendix A for
details).
Firstly, from (62) we specify a slightly modiﬁed estimation equation that
includes a time-trend.7
ln(ytpmt) = ®0 + ln
¡
®1x1 + ®2x2 + ®3x3 + ®4x4 ¡ cmt + ®5t
1=3¢
+ ": (63)
The results from non-linear least squares (NLS) estimation of the equation
(63) for Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania are shown in Table 3.2. We use
seasonally adjusted monthly data spanning from July 1995 to February 2003
for Bulgaria (N = 91), from June 1994 to May 2003 for Croatia (N = 108)
and from January 1994 to May 2003 for Romania (N = 113).8
The long-run average level or expected value of the underground economy





which implies that the
7We constrain the trend within the logarithm and raise it to the power 1/3, which is
an arbitrary modiﬁcation not implied by the theoretical model.
8The data span is shorter for Bulgaria due to unavailability of data on M3 before mid
1995.
21share of the underground economy in the form of the ration of non-market
and market consumption is given by e¡®o = 1¡º
º . From the results reported
in Table 3.2 we obtain the following results



























These estimates appear higher then the previously available ﬁgures in the
literature (see e.g. Johnson et al. (1997), Schneider (2000), and Schneider
and Klinglmair (2004)) and suggest that non-market output is about half of
the market output in Bulgaria and Croatia, and as much as 80% in Romania.
Note however, that in estimation we used industrial production which was a
monthly proxy for the GDP; thus a further normalisation needs to be applied
if underground economy is to be expressed as the percentage of the reported
GDP.
Table 1: The mean level of the underground economy
NLS estimates
Bulgaria Croatia Romania
Coeﬃcient Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
®0 0.6255 (0.0199) 0.6376 (0.0536) 0.1892 (0.0116)
®1 –0.0456 (0.0109) –0.0341 (0.1469) 0.0534 (0.0305)
®2 0.0355 (0.0200) 1.5431 (3.7783) 0.1189 (0.3614)
®3 –0.0398 (0.0287) 0.2787 (1.8306) 0.2658 (0.3858)
®4 0.0175 (0.0062) 10.9660 (9.9026) 1.1642 (0.5199)
®5 –56.2631 (12.8820) –34.5590 (15.9330) –0.4871 (0.5021)
Irrespective of the actual GDP-share that underground economy accounts
for, our estimates indicate diﬀerent magnitude of the non-market sectors
among the three countries. Namely, it is explicit from the above results that
Romanian non-market sector has higher magnitude relative to the market
sector then the non-market sectors in Bulgaria and Croatia.
223.3 Structural equation modelling
The ﬁrst aim of the structural equation modelling is estimation of the latent
underground economy time series, and the second aim is evaluation of its
impact on the rate of growth of the market-sector output. We address these
issues in the structural equation modelling framework using certain special
cases of the general dynamic structural equation model (SEM).
In brief, the static structural equation model with latent variables (SEM)
(J¨ oreskog and S¨ orbom 1996, J¨ oreskog et al. 2001) is speciﬁed with three ma-
trix equations–the structural equation, the measurement equation for latent
exogenous variables, and the measurement equation for latent endogenous
variables
´ = ®´ + B´ + Γ» + ³; x = ®x + Λx» + ±; y = ®y + Λy´ + "; (64)
where ´ is a (m £ 1) matrix of endogenous latent variables; » is a (g £ 1)
matrix of exogenous latent variables; B and Γ are (m £ m) and (m £ g)
matrices of structural coeﬃcients, respectively; Λx and Λy are k £ g and
l £ m matrices of factor loadings, respectively; ®´, ®x, and ®y are (m £ 1),
(k £ 1), and (l £ 1) matrices of intercepts, respectively.
The static SEM model, aside of lacking dynamics relevant in time se-
ries models, is based on the multivariate normality assumption. This is
a problem for dynamic models and time series data since N observations







will have a joint multivariate normal dis-









if and only if their joint density can be written as a
product of their individual densities, which requires independence of consec-
utive observations. For example, in a simple regression model yt = °xt + "t
making the assumption that "t » N implies that yt » N, however serial
dependence of yt in general does not correspond to that of "t as the later
can be serially uncorrelated conditional on the former. For example, in a
correctly speciﬁed dynamic model e.g. yt = ¯1yt¡1 + °0xt + °1xt¡1 + "t it is
possible that "t is a white noise process while yt is serially correlated or even
23a long-memory process. Thus, if the dynamics in yt are correctly speciﬁed,
making the assumption that " » i:i:d: is reasonable; the same assumption
about yt however would be incorrect.
This turns out to be an important issue in the ML estimation technique
developed by J¨ oreskog and S¨ orbom (1996). Namely, this approach makes
distributional assumptions about the data vector Y ´ (x : y), requiring Y
to be i.i.d. multivariate normal and makes use of the model-implied covari-
ance matrix ΣY Y = E[YY
0], where making use of (64) the data vectors
are parameterised as y = Λy [(I ¡ B)¡1(Γ» + ³)]+" and x = Λx» +±. The
maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters are obtained by min-
imising the likelihood function L = lnjΣY Y j + tr(SΣ
¡1
Y Y ) ¡ lnjSj ¡ k, where
Y 2 Rk and lnjSj¡k was subtracted from the ordinary multivariate normal
likelihood to obtain a discrepancy function.
On the other hand, if we deal with a dynamic structural equation model
model that includes lags of ´t and »t variables, the i.i.d. assumption about
Y could be replaced with the assumption that ³t is i.i.d. conditional on
correctly speciﬁed dynamics of Y. In the context of maximum likelihood
estimation with serially dependent data, the ML estimator would be actually
a quasi-ML estimator. The quasi-ML estimator for dependent data is known
to be consistent and asymptotically normal regardless of the treatment of
the pre-sample observations (Wooldridge 1994).
Estimation of general dynamic structural equation models (DSEM) can
be done by limited- and full-information instrumental variables methods
(Czir´ aky 2003). However, as the IV methods generally require longer time
series then those available for transitional countries, in this paper we propose
an alternative full-information maximum likelihood method for the estima-
tion of the general DSEM model.
Czir´ aky (2003) formulated a dynamic structural equation model with
latent variables (DSEM) as a time series generalisation of the static SEM
model.9 The DSEM model is speciﬁed as a structural autoregressive dis-
tributed lag model of the form
9A static version of this model can be easily estimated by software packages such as
LISREL 8.54 (see e.g. Czir´ aky, 2004).






Γj»t¡j + ³t; (65)
where ®´, B0, and Γ0 are coeﬃcient matrices from the static model (64), and
B1, B2,..., Bp, Γ1, Γ2,..., Γq are the additional p+q matrices that contain
coeﬃcients of the lagged endogenous and exogenous latent variables.10 Note
that the speciﬁcation (65) is simultaneous because contemporaneous endoge-
nous latent variables might be included as regressors (i.e. B0 6= 0). If we
assume time-invariance of the measurement model, the usual speciﬁcation
for xt and yt applies. Hence the structural part of the model (65) can be
augmented with the measurement equation for the latent exogenous variables
xt = ®x + Λx»t + ±t (66)
and for the latent endogenous variables
yt = ®y + Λy´t + "t (67)
The matrix equations (65)-(67) provide full speciﬁcation of the general
DSEM model directly extending the static structural equation model with
latent variables (SEM) to the time series case. It follows that the static SEM
is a special case of the DSEM model.
However, the DSEM model from (65)–(67) cannot be directly estimated
due to the presence of unobserved latent components. To solve this problem
and enable estimation of the model parameters, we rewrite the latent variable
speciﬁcation in terms of the observed variables and latent errors only, follow-
ing the approach used by Bollen (1996; 2001; 2002). Bollen used such spec-
iﬁcation to enable non-parametric estimation of standard (cross-sectional)
structural equation models with an aim of achieving greater robustness to
misspeciﬁcation and non-normality.
A similar approach can be used to re-write the DSEM model in the ob-
served form speciﬁcation (OFS) and to subsequently estimate all model pa-
10Note that (65) does not require speciﬁcation of lagged latent variables as separate
variables; rather each vector containing all modelled and exogenous latent variables is
written for each included lag separately, with a separate coeﬃcient matrix. Also note that
(65) allows diﬀerent lag lengths for diﬀerent latent variables (i.e., elements of ´ and »
vectors) by appropriate speciﬁcation of Bj and Γj matrices (e.g., zero elements).
25rameters (except latent error terms) by generalised instrumental variables
methods (see Czir´ aky (2004b)).
By ignoring the speciﬁc structure of the measurement error terms, let




j=0 Γj±1t¡j, u2t ´ "2t ¡ Λ
(y)
2 "1t, and
u3t ´ ±2t ¡ Λ
(x)
2 ±1t the structural OFS equations can then be written as






Γjx1t¡j + u1t; (68)











2 x1t + u3t: (70)
The estimation of the OFS equations can be done using the instrumental
variable (IV) methods (Czir´ aky 2003). In this paper we consider maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation, which is likely to have better small sample prop-
erties. The ML estimators for the DSEM model might be constructed ei-
ther as full information (FIML) or limited information maximum likelihood
(LIML) estimators, depending on the treatment of certain restrictions in the
covariance matrix of the latent errors. In this sense LIML would not neces-
sarily imply that we are not estimating all equations of the system, rather
that information contained in these equations might be incomplete. However,
we will use the term “full information” to refer to estimation of all equations
in the system. In particular, we will refer to the ML estimator of the OFS
system of equations as “OFS-FIML” in this context.
























26To simplify the notation, we deﬁne Ωz ´ ΛΩuΛ0. The equations (??)–
(69) can be estimated by maximising the (conditional) multivariate Gaussian
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See Appendix C for technical details and speciﬁcation of the Ωz matrix.
3.3.1 A MIMIC model for the underground economy
The problem of measuring the latent underground economy is twofold. The
ﬁrst problem is to ﬁx or calibrate the scale of the underground economy
latent variable thus enabling estimation of the underground economy time
series scores. To solve this problem we took a model-derived estimation ap-
proach utilizing our theoretical model and subsequently deriving an econo-
metric estimation equation that allowed estimation of the time average of
the underground economy share.
27The second problem is how to measure the latent underground econ-
omy with the observable macroeconomic indicators, which poses even greater
methodological challenges. Our solution to the measurement problem in-
volves a latent variable measurement model, which we specify as a multiple
indicator multiple causes (MIMIC) model following the contemporary liter-
ature (see Giles (1999) for a review).
We specify our MIMIC model as a special case of the general DSEM model
and use OFS-FIML estimation procedure to obtain the coeﬃcient estimates.
Subsequently, we estimate scale-free latent scores from the MIMIC model
and calibrate them with the model-derived scale.
The MIMIC model can be speciﬁed as a special case of the general DSEM
model where Bj = 0;8j > 0, Γj = 0 for j > 0, Λx = I, and Θ± = 0. Hence,
the MIMIC model can be speciﬁed as
´t = Γ0»t + ³t (73)
yt = Λy´t + "t (74)
xt = »t: (75)























t] = ΛyΓ0Φ, and E[xtx0
t] =
E[»t»0
















y, ΣY Y = E[YY0] and Y = (yt : xt),
Φ = E[»t»0
t], Ψ = E[³t³0
t], and Θ" = E["t"0
t].
We specify the MIMIC model for the underground economy using the
available monthly time series data for the West-Balkans countries (Bulgaria,
Croatia, and Romania). Preliminary unit-root tests indicated that most
28variables are I(1), hence we ﬁrst-diﬀerenced them before estimation. Variable
description and notation are given in Table 2.











The model is speciﬁed in two parts. Underground economy is assumed























Furthermore, underground economy is measured by the currency/money
ratio, unemployment, and consumption (where market sector retail sales are




























where the variable deﬁnitions are given in Table 2. We normalise the mea-
surement model (79) by setting ¸1 = 1. The coeﬃcient matrices from (78)
and (79) are therefore
29Γ0 =
³












































We estimate the model (78)–(79) by OFS-FIML methods. The OFS
equations corresponding to the model (78)–(79) are given by
∆UEt = ®´ + °1∆Wt + °2∆Pt + °3∆Rt + °4∆M1t + u1t
∆Ut = ®
(y)
21 + ¸2∆UEt + u2t
∆Ct = ®
(y)
22 + ¸3∆UEt + u3t
where u1t = (³t+"1t), u2t = ("2t¡¸2"1t), and u3t = ("3t¡¸3"1t). The typical
MIMIC restriction placed on the Θ" matrix require Θ" = diag(µ1;µ2;µ3),











Namely, for the model (78)–(79), these restrictions are based on the assump-
tion that E[³t"i] = 0, E["i"j] = 0 for i 6= j. Therefore, the covariances in Ω0
are calculated as
30Var(u1t) = E[(³t + "1t)(³t + "1t)]
= E[³2
t + 2"1t³t + "2
1t] = ! + µ1
Var(u2t) = E[("2t ¡ ¸2"1t)("2t ¡ ¸2"1t)]
= E["2
2t ¡ 2¸2"1t"2t + ¸2
2"2
1t] = µ2 ¡ ¸2
2µ1
Var(u3t) = E[("3t ¡ ¸3"1t)("3t ¡ ¸3"1t)]
= E["2
3t ¡ 2¸3"3t"1t + ¸2
3"2
1t] = µ3 + ¸2
3µ1
Cov(u2t;u1t) = E[("2t ¡ ¸2"1t)(³t + "1t)]
= E["2t³t ¡ ¸2"1t³t + "2t"1t ¡ ¸2"1t"1t] = ¡¸2µ1
Cov(u3t;u1t) = E[("3t ¡ ¸3"1t)(³t + "1t)]
= E["3t³t ¡ ¸3"1t³t + "3t"1t ¡ ¸3"1t"1t] = ¡¸3µ1
Cov(u3t;u2t) = E[("3t ¡ ¸3"1t)("2t ¡ ¸2"1t)]
= E["3t"2t ¡ ¸3"1t"2t ¡ ¸2"3t"1t + ¸3¸2"1t"1t] = ¸3¸2µ1:






¡¸2µ1 µ2 ¡ ¸2
2µ1





Note that ignoring the above restrictions placed on the Ωu matrix in
the OFS-FIML estimation would be equivalent to specifying Θ" as a full
symmetric matrix, which in turn implies correlated errors in the measurement
part of the MIMIC model. In fact, the restriction that Θ" must be diagonal
comes from the classical factor analysis while, in principle, general SEM and
DSEM models allow for non-diagonal Θ".
OFS-FIML estimates of the MIMIC model coeﬃcients are shown in Ta-
ble 3.3.1. Recalling that we ﬁxed the scale of ∆UEt by ﬁxing ¸1 = 1
which assumes positive link between the underground economy and the cur-
rency/money ratio.
The bottom part of the Table 3.3.1 gives several measures of the ap-
proximate ﬁt. The reported Â2 goodness-of-ﬁt tests are strictly valid only
for models with independent data and in should be interpreted with caution
when time series data are used. Amemiya and Anderson (1990) however
show that this test is asymptotically distributed Â2 under some very general
31Table 3: MIMIC model estimates
Bulgaria Croatia Romania
Coeﬃcient ML GLS ML GLS ML GLS
¸2 –9.0809 –8.7336 10.8295 8.1138 8.3391 8.3343
(SE) (4.2937) (3.6004) (5.19081) (4.0576) (4.5942) (5.5267)
¸3 9.1889 11.4370 –20.4402 –15.1907 0.5302 0.3528
(SE) (3.9653) (5.9996) (13.6183) (7.2057) (0.2383) (0.1399)
°1 0.0039 0.0035 –0.0013 –0.0016 –0.0106 –0.0104
(SE) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0019)
°2 –0.0002 –0.0005 0.0048 0.0063 –0.0034 –0.0035
(SE) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0027) (0.0017)
°3 –0.0001 –0.0001 0.0009 0.0014 –0.0050 –0.0006
(SE) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0003)
°4 0.0003 0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0025 –0.0025
(SE) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
µ
(")
1 0.0059 0.0058 0.0030 0.0028 0.0277 0.0260
(SE) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0129) (0.0122)
µ
(")
2 16.5769 14.2697 5.6995 4.5283 45.9634 43.3586
(SE) (2.5009) (2.3469) (0.9833) (0.8363) (6.2291) (6.0501)
µ
(")
3 25.4738 20.6782 29.5228 24.2119 101.3173 94.2274
(SE) (3.8275) (3.5212) (4.5451) (4.0499) (13.5998) (13.1308)
Â2 11.5185 14.2235 14.5612 14.3637 6.9738 7.3949
(d.f.) 8 8 8 8 8 8
SRMR 0.5413 0.0772 0.0654 0.0802 0.0474 0.0522
GFI 0.9693 0.9549 0.9628 0.9613 0.9827 0.9810
assumptions. In addition we report the standardised root-mean-square er-
ror of approximation (SRMR) and the goodness-of-ﬁt index (GFI). These ﬁt
statistics generally indicate relatively good ﬁt in all three countries.
The MIMIC results indicate negative relationship between the under-
ground economy and the nominal interest rate for Bulgaria and for Romania
(°3), which is compatible with the hypothesis H1. For Croatia, on the other
hand, the relationship between the underground economy and the nominal
interest rate appears to be positive, however the estimates of the °3 coeﬃcient
are signiﬁcant only for Romania.
32The relationship between the inﬂation rate and the underground economy
(°2) is also negative (hypothesis H2) for Bulgaria and Romania, while the
hypothesized sign does not appear to hold for Croatia. Again, the estimated
°2 coeﬃcient seems to be of signiﬁcant magnitude only for Romania.
Interesting diﬀerences can be observed in the measurement models among
the three countries. With the unit-loading restriction imposed on ∆MCt, the
estimated loadings (¸2 and ¸3) diﬀer both in sign and in magnitude (the re-
ported estimates are unstandardized). Unemployment (∆Ut) appears to be a
negative indicator of the latent underground economy only in Bulgaria, while
it is positive in Croatia and Romania, with magnitudes being similar across
the countries. On the other hand, the market-sector consumption (∆Ct) has
negative loading only in Croatia and, while positive, the loading is of very
small magnitude in Romania. These observed diﬀerences are indicative of
diﬀerent measurement models and thus of likely diﬀerent composition of the
underground economy across the three Balkans’ countries.
The “causes”of the underground economy also diﬀer across countries, but
their eﬀect seems to be very small in terms of coeﬃcients’ magnitude and
statistical signiﬁcance. However, it is interesting to note that wages (∆Wt)
seem to negatively aﬀect the underground economy both in Croatia and Ro-
mania, while they have a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect in Bulgaria. Inﬂation
(∆Pt), on the other hand, aﬀects underground economy positively only in
Croatia while its eﬀect is negative in the other two countries. Diﬀerences
across countries in signs and magnitudes of the eﬀects are notable also for
the interest rate (∆Rt) and money (∆Mt).
Scaling the latent scores with the estimated long-run or expected value
of the underground economy share (Table 3.2), and expressing them as % of
the market sector output, we obtain time series plots shown in Figure 1.
3.3.2 Underground economy and output growth
We specify an empirical model that captures dynamic impact of the under-
ground economy on the output growth in the market sector as a special case
of the general DSEM model. The structural part of the model includes p = 4
lags of output growth and a ﬁrst diﬀerence of the underground economy














Figure 1: Market and non-market output
share. The “causes”of the underground economy enter without lags (q = 0).
The measurement model for the underground economy is the same as in
the MIMIC model where time-invariance is assumed and output growth is
treated as perfectly observed. Therefore, we specify the structural part of










































































































34The corresponding OFS form of this model is thus given by the following
equations
























∆Ut = ®3 + ¸22∆CMt + u3t
∆Ct = ®4 + ¸32∆CMt + u4t
We estimate the OFS equations with the OFS-FIML method described
above. The estimation results are given in Table 3.3.2. The factor-loadings
from the previously estimated MIMIC model (¸2 and ¸3) are very similar to
those from the MIMIC model which implies that the inclusion of dynamics
and structural eﬀects did not aﬀect the measurement model. Similarly, the
“causes”from the MIMIC model also have similar coeﬃcients in the structural
model.
The DSEM estimates conﬁrm the previously reported MIMIC results re-
garding the hypotheses H1 and H2. Namely, the contemporaneous eﬀects of
the nominal interest rate (°0
23) on the underground economy is negative (hy-
pothesis H1) for Bulgaria and Romania, while the sign is positive for Croatia.
Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) report panel results where the sign of the
inﬂation eﬀect might diﬀer between transitional and other countries, but
they merely estimate the inﬂation eﬀect on growth and do not consider its
eﬀect on the underground economy. Here we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of inﬂation
(or interest rates) on the underground economy might be diﬀerent among
transitional countries.
The important inside from the DSEM results are reﬂected in the ability
to test the hypothesis H3, which includes dynamic eﬀects of up to four lags.
The hypothesized negative eﬀect of the underground economy on output
growth (H3) is found for Croatia and Romania (coeﬃcients ¯1
22–¯4
22), while
this eﬀect appears to be generally positive for Bulgaria.
35Table 4: DSEM model estimates
FIML estimates
Bulgaria Croatia Romania
Coeﬃcient Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
¯1
11 –0.4640 (0.1017) –0.5998 (0.1090) –0.3362 (0.1202)
¯2
11 –0.5148 (0.1048) –0.6119 (0.1079) –0.3965 (0.1154)
¯3
11 –0.4140 (0.1070) –0.4013 (0.1068) –0.0968 (0.1196)
¯4
11 –0.3124 (0.0997) –0.2201 (0.0966) –0.2254 (0.1167)
¯0
12 –2.7930 (1.9947) –28.2280 (10.1520) 5.8369 (3.8616)
¯1
12 2.4853 (1.8460) –6.3435 (3.3250) 1.4059 (1.1458)
¯2
12 8.5366 (3.7199) 16.7490 (7.0060) –7.5948 (3.1355)
¯3
12 –10.6530 (4.8818) 23.4910 (11.4100) –7.5940 (3.5974)
°0
12 –0.0210 (0.0216) 0.0239 (1.0422) 0.3294 (0.1866)
°0
13 0.0058 (0.0048) –0.1772 (0.5421) –0.0334 (0.1006)
°0
14 0.0040 (0.0033) 0.1163 (0.0636) –0.0064 (0.0099)
¯1
22 0.0476 (0.0851) –0.1324 (0.0736) –0.3293 (0.0837)
¯2
22 0.1639 (0.0837) –0.0819 (0.0722) –0.2986 (0.0875)
¯3
22 –0.0030 (0.0822) 0.0607 (0.0691) –0.0535 (0.0822)
¯4
22 0.1410 (0.0836) –0.1618 (0.0777) –0.1403 (0.0772)
°0
21 0.0045 (0.0013) –0.0018 (0.0009) –0.0010 (0.0009)
°0
22 –0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0049 (0.0057) –0.0014 (0.0025)
°0
23 –0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0028 (0.0030) –0.0006 (0.0014)
°0
24 0.0002 (0.0000) –0.0004 (0.0003) –0.0007 (0.0002)
¸22 –7.0331 (5.7756) 13.5410 (17.0030) 8.8110 (4.9852)
¸32 14.7880 (7.5364) –19.7070 (42.0220) 0.5386 (0.8504)
Â2 43.3215 74.3573 52.7598
(d.f.) 27 27 27
The overall signiﬁcance of these dynamic eﬀects can be obtained by test-
ing for Granger causality. For the given data length we can only use simple
(bivariate) Granger causality test applied on the factor scores of the latent
underground economy estimated from the MIMIC model. Such approach
was proposed by Giles et al. (1999), with the diﬀerence that we compute
latent scores using a formal procedure described in J¨ oreskog (2000).
Results from the pairwise Granger causality tests using latent scores and
including 10 lags for testing the temporal causal eﬀect of the underground
36economy on output growth (using ﬁrst diﬀerences) indicate highly signiﬁcant
eﬀect in Croatia, and somewhat less signiﬁcant eﬀect in Romania, while in
Bulgaria there does not appear to be any evidence of Granger causality (see
Table 5). Note that these results thus support the hypothesis H3
Table 5: Granger causality tests
Country F-test (d.f.) F-value F-probability
Bulgaria F(10, 59) 1.0869 0.1869
Croatia F(10, 75) 4.3711 0.0001
Romania F(10, 80) 1.1646 0.0269
In the literature, generally the eﬀect of the underground economy on
growth is considered to be ambiguous. Loayza (1996) points out that this
eﬀect might be negative in the economies with larger then optimal statutory
tax burden and where the enforcement of compliance is weak. Transitional
and developing countries would therefore be expected to have such negative
relationship between the underground economy and growth (e.g. Loayza
(1996) ﬁnds a negative relationship among Latino-American countries). How-
ever, this cannot easily explain the empirical lack of a signiﬁcantly negative
eﬀect in Bulgaria as opposite to Croatia and Romania, as it would be diﬃcult
to argue that Bulgarian statutory tax burden and enforcement system are
substantially better then those in Croatia and Romania.
Schneider and Klinglmair (2004), on the other hand, ﬁnd Loayza (1996)’s
conclusions overly dependent on unrealistic assumptions11 and suggest a pos-
sibility that the underground economy responds to the economic environ-
ment, namely to the demand for urban services and small-scale manufac-
turing. Given a substantial small and medium enterprizes (SME) sector
in transitional countries12 and its varying magnitude across the countries,
the possible link between the underground economy’s eﬀect on growth and
11For example, Loayza (1996) assumes dependence of the production technology on tax-
ﬁnanced public services, which are in turn subject to congestion and which are in not
ﬁnanced by penalties paid by the informal sector.
12This is especially true in Croatia, see e.g. Czir´ aky et al. (2003a))
37enterprize-type structure of the economy is interesting. Furthermore, Schnei-
der and Klinglmair (2004) suggest that the voluntary self-selection between
the formal and informal sectors might induce higher growth by creating a
higher potential for economic development.
While ambiguous on the ultimate sign of the eﬀect of the underground
economy on growth, this literature does suggest a possibility that the sign
of the eﬀect depends on the development level and/or enterprize structure
of the economy. In a large panel of both developed and developing countries
Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the underground
economy on growth in developing and transitional countries, while the eﬀect
is positive for the developed countries.
However, there are two important aspects that need to be taken into
consideration. Firstly, the estimates Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) report
use a panel with a dominant cross-sectional dimension (104 countries over
ten annual time points) thus any time dynamics and diﬀerences between
long- and short-run eﬀects cannot be taken into consideration. However, the
temporal dimension would have to be a long-run one due to the used data
frequency, yet the time span is limited to 10 years. Due to similar data
limitations but with monthly frequency we were able to estimate short-run
eﬀects up to one quarter (four monthly lags), but extending our results to
the long-run would be rather informal.
Secondly, the underground economy estimates used by Schneider and
Klinglmair (2004) were obtained from cross-sectional data generally treating
the analysed countries as random observations, which is highly problematic.
Namely, the underground economy estimates were used to test for the possi-
ble diﬀerences among countries in terms of the underground economy’s eﬀect
on growth, and indeed such diﬀerences were found. Yet, the estimates of
the underground economy used by Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) were not
obtained from time series data for each country separately. This problem is
particularly acute when structural equation models (e.g. MIMIC) are used.
In addition, a general problem with “growth regressions” using estimated la-
tent scores for the underground economy share is that the estimated standard
errors are incorrect as they do not take into account the fact that the scores
38were estimated in another model. We note that the DSEM estimates reported
in this paper avoid the problem with incorrect standard errors, however the
Granger-causality tests do use estimated scores and are thus somewhat less
formal.
4 Conclusion
The paper investigated the eﬀect of inﬂation on the growth rate in economies
with underground, or “non-market”, sectors. A model that incorporates a
non-market good into an endogenous growth cash-in-advance economy with
human capital was used where taxes on labor and capital induced substitu-
tion into the non-market sector.
The paper presented a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of how inﬂa-
tion can eﬀect growth in economies with shadow sectors. Then the analysis
was backed up with extensive econometric testing using transition country
data.
The departure point for the analysis was an exogenous growth economy
without money or any taxes, but with a role for development through a
diﬀering cost of capital depending on development level.
We adopt an econometric framework that enables both measurement of
the latent underground economy series and estimation of the dynamic struc-
tural equation models that include underground economy as a latent variable.
Moreover, we use the theoretically-derived equilibrium conditions to estimate
the mean of the underground economy, which is needed in setting the scale
and range of the estimated latent underground economy variable. Further-
more, we estimate a dynamic structural equation model and investigate the
eﬀects of the underground economy on output growth and test for Granger
causality using bivariate Granger-causality tests. We ﬁnd some evidence in
support of the theoretically-implied negative sign of the eﬀect of the nominal
interest rates and the inﬂation rate for Bulgaria and Romania. The neg-
ative eﬀect of the underground economy on output growth implied by our
theoretical model was supported in the dynamic context and we ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant evidence of Granger causality for Croatia and Romania, while this eﬀect
39failed to reach statistical signiﬁcance for Bulgaria.
Finally, we note that full implications of the theoretical model require
further empirical testing, which calls for more detailed data that would in-
clude information on taxes and capital. This would require a large panel
data set since time series data generally does not provide suﬃcient variabil-
ity in taxes, thus suggesting an interesting extension of the empirical results
reported in this paper.
Appendix
A Derivation of the scale-calibration equation
Firstly, we need to make few simplifying assumptions in order to deal with the
otherwise untractable non-linearities in the equilibrium conditions. Note that in
(1) and (2) the aggregate consumption good and the current period utility function
were parameterised with the utility function parameters º and ". Without loss of
generality, we can assume an admissible value for ", namely " = 2, in which case
the aggregate consumption good ct = [ºc"
mt + (1 ¡ º)c"
nt]1=" assumes a convenient
form of a weighted Euclidean norm in cmt and cnt, i.e. ct =
p
ºc2
mt + (1 ¡ º)c2
nt.
In addition, we set the ° parameter in the production function (19) to its mean
admissible value of 0.5, recalling that ° 2 (0;1).
Now, we derive the expression for the underground economy using the equilib-









1 + atRt + (1 ¡ at)°Rt
pnt(1 + Rt)
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1 + atRt + (1 ¡ at)°Rt
:
To write this expression in terms of the total underground economy we need to








1 + atRt + (1 ¡ at)°Rt
:
This, however, leaves us with the square of pnt, which is a latent quantity. To
proceed we need another assumption, namely that the price level in the non-market
sector is approximately equal to the price level in the market sector. Alternatively,
we might assume that these two variables are linearly related i.e. pnt = ®pmt.
Using the simplest case with ® = 1 and deﬁning cmtpmt ´ yt, where yt denotes







1 + atRt + (1 ¡ at)°Rt
;
which gives us the expression for the total non-market good i.e. underground
economy. Now we need to substitute the equation for at from (44), which we
simplify by setting ° = 0:5, hence
°
1¡° = 1 and 1
1¡° = 2 and therefore















where ¯ ´ 1
2A2(1 + ¿c) and ± ´ (1 ¡ ¿l), i.e., we treat ¿c and ¿l as constants.13
We can now complete the expression for the non-market output as
13Note that tax rates generally do not diﬀer across time within particular coun-
tries, and since our focus is on time series data the assumption of constant or

























































The above derived equation, while providing an expression for the non-market
goods output, does not have an additive intercept that would mimic its average or














We can solve the equilibrium condition (43) for cntpnt in a similar fashion using
the above expression for at recalling that ¯ ´ 1























































42Finally, by equating (80) to (81) we can derive an econometric estimation
















































































































































































which gives an econometric estimation equation. We can simplify the notation by
deﬁning the following coeﬃcients ®0 ´ ¡ln[(1 ¡ º)=º], ®1 ´ A2=¯, ®2 ´ ¡A2=±,



















43Using the above deﬁnitions, the derived estimation equation becomes
ln(ytpmt) = ®0 + ln(®1x1 + ®2x2 + ®3x3 + ®4x4 ¡ cmt): (82)
B Derivation of the OFS equations
We show that the general DSEM model (68)–(70) can be written in the observed
form speciﬁcation (OFS) that consists of the observed variables and latent errors
only.
The OFS uses the fact that in the measurement model for each latent variable
one loading can be ﬁxed to one without loss of generality. Thus, we can re-write




















































Note that the observed indicators with unit loadings were placed in the top
part of the vectors for xt and yt and thus the upper part of the lambda matrix is
an identity matrix. Having divided xt into xt1 and xt2, note that for xt1 it holds
that
x1t = »t + ±1t ) »t = x1t ¡ ±1t (85)
and, similarly, for yt1 we can replace the latent variable with its unit-loading
indicators
y1t = ´t + "1t ) ´t = y1t ¡ "1t (86)
It is now possible to use the relations in (85) and (86) to re-write the measurement
































Following the same principle it is possible to re-write the structural part of the
model using deﬁnitions (85) and (86) as follows
y1t ¡ "1t = ®´ +
p X
j=0
Bj(y1t¡j ¡ "1t¡j) +
q X
j=0
Γj(x1t¡j ¡ ±1t¡j) + ³t: (89)
Separating the observed part of the model from the latent errors we obtain










































Aside of the speciﬁc structure of the latent error terms, (90)–(92) present a classical
structural equation system with observed variables. This completes the derivation
of the OFS equations.
C Derivation of the OFS-FIML estimator
We consider estimation of the OFS equations (68)–(70) with full-information max-
imum likelihood methods based on the multivariate Gaussian likelihood.





u2t ´ "2t ¡ Λ
(y)
2 "1t, and u3t ´ ±2t ¡ Λ
(x)
2 ±1t. Then the structural OFS equations
can be written as
















2 x1t + u3t:
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To simplify the notation, we deﬁne Ωz ´ ΛΩuΛ0. Therefore, the (conditional)
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